of the person over time. Moral choices shape the character of the one who makes them insofar as they integrate personal character or retard moral development. 5 We become what we do.
ASPECTS OF CONSCIENCE
Moral theologian Timothy O'Connell distinguishes three meanings of anterior conscience which can be called conscience as capacity, as process, and as judgment. 6 Humans have the capacity to determine right from wrong and to recognize moral claims upon them. Apart from those who are brain-damaged or pathological, humans have this capacity for responsibility as part of the equipment of their species. Possessing the ability, however, does not guarantee its proper exercise any more than possessing reason makes one consistently rational. Despite the skepticism of postmodernism, there is considerable evidence for a common human morality. Humans live under analogous moral systems and can argue about moral issues across cultural and linguistic boundaries. We condemn the atrocities in Kosovo as violations of human dignity; they cannot be excused as customary Balkan behavior.
Conscience also involves a practical process. It seeks to determine the right and appropriate action in particular situations. Perceiving moral salience and the ability to take the perspective of others into account prompt this reflection. 7 Depending upon the complexity of the moral situation, we strive to clarify matters by determining our options, assessing their relative moral worth, imagining consequences, seeking advice, recalling relevant standards and comparable experiences. We do not follow a set sequence in moral reflection but a more circular path that tests one source against another. Because this process integrates so many different aspects of the person it cannot be capsulized into a formula or technique. 8 In order to deliberate wisely and accurately we need specific skills: honest searching for the facts, prudent reflection, a willingness to entertain dissenting opinions and unpleasant consequences, acknowledgment of personal bias and fallibility. These skills of conscience as process are rooted in the deeper aspects of conscience as capacity. They depend upon the degree of personal maturity, emotional stability, social awareness, and the virtuous or vicious habits that define the agent's character.
Eventually the process of conscientious deliberation comes to the point of decision, a judgment that embraces the truth that some course of action ought to be followed. As Callahan writes: "We commit outselves in wholehearted decisions of conscience when we achieve a fully congruent, reflective equilibrium of reason, intuition, and emotion. The picture finally comes into focus. After a fully personal engagement, there is nothing held back, suppressed, or untested in the struggle. We act at full capacity, as morally competent as we can be." 9 The truth discovered in the process of deliberation makes a claim upon us. We have found the right thing to do, or the more morally compelling course, or the least harmful of the available options. Traditional moral theology insisted that even an objectively erroneous conscience still obliges the person. 10 Failing to obey the claim that we have come to recognize would violate our personal integrity. At times we consciously choose what to do; at other times we recognize that the choice has already been made. The skills of acting well can be distinguished from the skills of reflecting well. To decide to act on one's conscience calls for another set of virtues: resoluteness, courage, persistence, and passionate attachment to the moral good.
Hasty and poorly informed processes of deliberation can produce judgments that are held with great conviction. Nevertheless, we can always ask someone to rethink his or her judgment, because the process of making the decision is always fallible. Questioning the discernment and deliberation that led up to a decision does not violate the integrity of the person who made it. What happens when people claim that conscience dictates actions that will be seriously harmful to others? If they cannot be persuaded to reconsider the matter, they should be prevented from acting on their conscience.
SOCIAL DIMENSION OF CONSCIENCE
Conscience relies on the moral quality of the groups to which we belong. We gain our moral bearings from the communities we are born into and deliberately choose, beginning with family and extending to peers, other adults, religious and professional communities. We carry their voices in our heads, for better and for worse. Recent research indicates that people identify with those values and principles that are supported by communities that matter to them. O'Connell writes in his recent work on moral formation that we live up or down to the standards of the groups to which we belong: "the more my relationships depend on my having a particular role, the more that role will be central to me. And the more a particular role is central to me, the greater the likelihood that in role-related settings I will behave in accord with that role."
11 His investigation of psychological and sociological resources leads him to a clear conclusion: "values are transmitted through groups."
12 In groups we find our identity and the inspiration and accountability to lead a moral life. Ministers who prefer one-to-one interaction with individuals may be less effective in forming Christian conscience. "Much more important are those interventions that join people not to the minister but to one another, and that is the sort of activity that most ministers enjoy less." 13 
Developmental psychologist William Damon writes:
In the end we must help our communities recapture what sociologist Amitai Etzioni refers to as their "moral voices". . . . Etzioni shows how our modern-day disinclination to "lay moral claims" has eroded the routine moral reactions of our communities and their members. He offers a compelling example of a psychiatrist who argues that doctors should not ask someone to make a risk-free bone marrow donation in order to save a sibling, because refusing to do so might produce guilt in the person who was asked and refused. Etzioni's reply: "If they refuse, they should feel guilty." Society is deprived of a crucial moral resource when families and communities fail to provide models of sound values and hide behind value neutrality. 15 The aimlessness and cynicism of some young people may say less about them than it does about their parents and the other adults in their world. 16 Families can help their children learn how to reflect morally by engaging them in discussions about real life issues in an encouraging manner. One study found that this style "includes behaviors such as eliciting the child's opinion, asking clarifying questions, paraphrasing, and checking for understanding-reminiscent of the Socratic style of questioning."
17
David Popenoe traces the decline of social virtue to deficiencies in the family and the institutions and communities that had supported families in the past. "The central significance of the community for moral development is this: moral development in children takes place in part through repetition and reinforcement, and through adapting fundamental moral values to a variety of social circumstances beyond the family."
18 When the child begins to move beyond the family, other institutions need to reinforce the values learned at home. Communities where similar standards are echoed in schools, teams, youth groups, and other associations form the most stable characters in the young. Popenoe, who has studied family systems in several cultures and paid special attention to the effect of absent fathers, offers this bracing advice to those who want to support social virtues: "As individuals, we should seek to stay married, stay accessible to our children, stay active in our local communities, and stay put."
19 A study of ten communities over a decade found that adolescent adjustment depends more upon a local consensus of values than any other predictor, including wealth or ethnicity. 20 This consensus is not often found in diverse modern societies, particularly when contrary values are supported in mass media.
Consciences are dulled when the young are not taught an adequate moral vocabulary and when moral debate is "dumbed down" into the vocabularies of self-interest and utilitarian advantage. 21 Mass media creates a pseudo community, particularly in the various forms of "youth culture." We are just beginning to appreciate the moral impact of the eighteen thousand hours of television that the average American youngster has seen by age eighteen. Sissela Bok argues persuasively that television's relentless depiction of violence as entertainment desensitizes habitual viewers to its human consequences. 22 Mass media creates certain expectations in the young which are often impervious to moral scrutiny or criticism. For all these reasons, conscience-formation is a more formidable task than it was when surrounding institutions reinforced the values inculcated in a stable home.
ISSUES IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT
Moral development is a perennial concern of moral philosophy and theology, but in recent decades it has gained attention from psychological research and debates over the role of public schools in shaping the values and behavior of students. William Bennett, Thomas Lickona and other advocates of traditional morality decry the public school's abandonment of explicit moral instruction. 23 They point out that American public education had always aimed at moral formation. 
27 Although early education may have the most formative impact on students' moral character, some evidence exists that undergraduates are still shaping their value systems, while this openness may diminish for students in graduate and professional schools.
28
Psychological studies of moral development take two different directions, from the past and from the future. The first views human development as primarily remedial. Growth into healthy, mature adulthood comes through gradually rectifying the traumatic events of infancy and childhood. This therapeutic model typically leaves the profile of moral maturity sketchy, perhaps in deference to the multiple life plans available in a pluralistic culture. Particularly for neo-Freudians, most moral formation occurs in the first decade of life, and much of it is negative. The problems of adult life can be traced back to the struggle of the child to differentiate from his or her parents sexually, morally, and psychologically. Here authentic conscience needs to be discovered beneath the tyranny of the superego that employs guilt and shame to repress the unruly id and reinforce 24 conventional morality. Problems of adult gender identity originate in the different forms of attachment that boys and girls have with the primary care giver, usually their mother. 29 Recently a more romantic form of this remedial approach is taken by the popular literature that urges adults to rediscover their "inner child" in order to unleash their native powers of growth. 30 Analyses of contemporary moral behavior based upon evolutionary psychology 31 and primatology also take their cues from the more remote past. 32 Generally, however, moral development looks more to the future for guidance. In Aristotelian terms, all natural growth is directed by the final cause, the perfected state of the entity. Human nature has innate potentials and inclinations to develop towards moral maturity, granted education and proper choice. The state of human flourishing that is found in the virtuous measures the intermediate stages. Although various thinkers and cultures depict human flourishing differently, naturalist ethics almost always posits some general features of individual and social maturity that normatively guide appropriate human growth.
American psychological research on moral development has until recently been dominated by Harvard's Lawrence Kohlberg and his disciples, in particular his former colleague who emerged as his foremost critic, Carol Gilligan. Considerable writing in women's studies and feminist ethics have been based on her work. It is sobering to realize how much of American research and writing on moral development over the past 30 years has been constructed on the work of Kohlberg and Gilligan with little or no awareness of the significant limitations of their theories about morality.
Resisting Freudian dogma on childhood formation and the ethical emotivism and behaviorism that were prevalent in the 1960s, Kohlberg posited 29 a highly rational model of moral reflection. 33 He derived a sequence of six stages of moral development from the stages of cognitive development outlined by Jean Piaget, whose work had recently been discovered by American psychologists. 34 If children progressively learned to incorporate the structures of causality, space, time, and the like into their thinking, Kohlberg reasoned, they should also progressively move to understand and employ the analogous universal moral structures. They would move from pre-conventional morality based on fear or shame to more conventional motives based on self-interest and peer respect. 35 The higher stages of morality would be post-conventional since the mature person comes to acknowledge moral obligations as autonomous claims. The final stage set the goal for moral development: acting according to universal moral principles for the good of humanity. 36 Philosophically, Kohlberg adopted a form of Kantian ethics in which obligation is central and moral claims are properly autonomous, that is, based on universalizable duties rather than on any emotive incentive or practical consequence. He grounded morality simply and exclusively on justice, that is, the fair and rational treatment accorded to others as equals and asserted that virtue is one and "the name of this ideal form is justice." 37 He concluded that there is an invariant, cross-cultural sequence in moral development that was attained step by step, with no regression to previous stages or straddling of the levels of moral reasoning.
38
Why concentrate on moral reasoning? In part, because verbally expressed rational skills are more accessible to measurement than the more interior dynamics of emotion, intuition, and imagination. Kohlberg's model permitted researchers to ignore the elusive arenas of moral sensitivity to 33 37 Kohlberg, Philosophy of Moral Development 1.30-31. 38 It would be an understatement to say that developmental psychologists welcomed this model. It promised a scientific (that is, "measurable") rationale for morality and it could explain moral variety without appealing to relativism. Moral disagreements arise from the conflicting perspectives held by persons at different stages of moral development. At best, people can grasp the moral point of view of the next stage beyond them, but they find more sophisticated perspectives unintelligible.
interpersonal and social complexities, intuitive judgments, moral dispositions, and character as the basis of action.
39
Unfortunately this whole movement appears to be based on flawed empirical and philosophical assumptions. Empirical evidence showed that infants are not as egocentric as Piaget and Kohlberg posited. Martin L. Hoffmann argued that children experience claims upon them that cannot be accounted for by rewards and punishments. Even though they are unable to articulate those claims verbally, one-year old infants typically display rudimentary forms of empathy and two year olds become aware of rules. 40 Interview results challenged Kohlberg's insistence on "hard stages" since "most children mix responses from the second and third stages, and most adults mix responses from states 3 and 4," writes psychologist Owen Flanagan. 41 Even by Kohlberg's measure, almost no one attains the highest stage of moral development, and "on the new scoring system the highest stage has no empirically confirmed instances." 42 Philosophically, Kohlberg's instrument appears narrow and rigid. Are all moral encounters and concerns reducible to fairness and impartiality? Consider relations between friends or family members: while fairness is a consideration, it cannot possibly be the sole guide. Does it make any sense to counsel a mother to treat her children solely according to what duty requires of her? Flanagan concludes that there is no "universal and irreversible sequence of stages according to which moral personality unfolds and against which moral maturity can be unequivocally plotted." judgment. 44 Finally, neither Kohlberg nor his followers have successfully demonstrated that clear thinking produces morally right conduct. In fact, research done on the cognitive processes of real-life moral virtuosos finds them scoring mostly at the level of conventional morality, a finding that calls into question the whole industry of testing and moral education inspired by Kohlberg. 45 More generally, this debate raises the question of whether any descriptive account of moral experience can ever rise to the level of a normative account. 46 Even the descriptions of moral development will be selected according to some conception of an end state that itself exercises normative influence, whether acknowledged or not. Referring to the desirable condition as "maturity" or "health" begs the question, unless some definition of these terms is presented. Kohlberg's putatively descriptive sequence was deeply influenced by his stage 6 which was the very model of Kantian moral autonomy; he later expanded his ideal as a liberally democratic citizen along Rawlsian lines. 47 Carol Gilligan's work on moral development suffers from similar reductionist tendencies. Her book In a Different Voice remains an academic bestseller nearly two decades after it appeared. 48 She challenged the rationalist and androcentric model of Kohlberg and proposed two seminal ideas: first, that there are two basic perspectives in moral reflection, one based on justice, the other on care; secondly, that men predominantly but not exclusively favor justice while women mostly prefer the care perspective. These ideas led to a vigorous academic debate about the adequacy of the care/justice hypothesis and a widespread assumption by many that Gilligan had demonstrated clear gender differences in moral reflection. Despite her caveats, her book was read not as a hypothesis about a differ-ent voice but as proof that she had discovered the different voice of women. Gilligan's subsequent writings have not clarified the matter. A collection she edited "maps the moral domain" exclusively along the justice/care dichotomy, while conceding that men and women are not anchored in a single perspective. 49 In the debate that followed, empirical evidence was advanced to assert that men and women do not in fact score differently on moral reasoning tests, even Kohlberg's. 50 Whether someone employs a care or justice perspective may have more to do with the nature of the problem presented than with the person's gender. In addition, men and women seem to switch readily from one perspective to another, with only minuscule groups of either gender using one perspective exclusively. 51 There are more fundamental problems with the hypothesis of two moral voices that make the debates about measuring gender preferences moot. Why should all moral considerations have to be jammed under the rubrics of care or justice? 52 Lawrence A. Blum suggests that community, honesty, courage, prudence are equally important and not reducible to care and impartiality. 53 Gilligan's original position and subsequent hypotheses rest on theories of childhood development, specifically Nancy Chodorow's neo-Freudian account of infant development that imprints a preference for separation on boys and attachment on girls. Gilligan later speculated that universal childhood experiences of powerlessness and attachment form the basis of the two voices and explains why people of both genders have access to each perspective. 54 In terms of moral philosophy, there may be less to "care" than meets the eye. People can be caring toward some groups but indifferent toward oth-ers. Distinct moral understandings, habits, and emotions are involved in caring for intimates as compared to caring for strangers, likewise in caring for groups as compared to caring for individuals. Ordinary moral development gradually extends concern for one's closest connections to concern for strangers, including those affected by social arrangements. Justice and fairness might be considered components of this expanded caring rather than its alternatives. Marilyn Friedman charges that Gilligan treats relationships too individualistically by removing them from their institutional settings. 55 Kathryn Tanner reconstructs an ethics of care so that it is not confined to immediate relations or fall prey to a gender essentialism which she sees as flaws in Gilligan's approach. 56 The popularity of Gilligan's binary model has not been diminished by its many critics. Nor has it been dimmed by her inability to chart a distinct developmental pattern for girls and women, a project she insisted was necessary before any further comparisons between the moral experience of men and women could be made. 57 This has not stopped them from being taken as canonical in some quarters. A recent textbook for graduate students in student development lists the many applications of her theory in teaching, social work, developmental psychology, moral and political philosophy, and student affairs. 58 While there is an intuitive plausibility to Gilligan's account, unfortunately her observations fall short of being empirically established or philosophically adequate.
PRACTICES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Moral development
has not yet become a major concern for virtue ethics, even though the topic was central to the moral philosophy of Aristotle, the traditional source of much virtue ethics. 59 Psychologists concentrate more on the moral development of children than on that of adults. 60 Attention is being increasingly given to the role that moral "practices" play in the formation of virtue and adult character.
William Damon quotes Spinoza's aphorism, "The palace of reasoning may be entered only through the courtyard of habit." 61 The importance of practices in the formation of virtuous habits has gained increasing attention since Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue. 62 In his usage, practices are socially established activities that lead those who participate in them to appreciate certain things as goods and to internalize standards of excellence in achieving them. Practices are done for their own sake, such as friendship, not for additional ends, such as practicing free throws in basketball. Martha Nussbaum recommends the engaged reading of literature as a practice that expands moral perception and empathy. This skill is a necessary component of humanistic education, even for lawyers and scientists. 63 Diana Fritz Cates argues that the practice of committed friendship trains desires and moral vision in the virtue of compassion. The willingness to engage others, even strangers, in their suffering gains added meaning as a practice within a Christian frame of reference.
writes: "Christianity cannot be explained or understood without reference to a distinctive cluster of practices. In order to participate in the tradition called Christianity one must necessarily participate in these practices." 71 He highlights certain practices of community moral formation: witness, worship, works of mercy, discernment, and discipleship. Reinhard Hutter points out that Luther redefined the marks of the Church to be practices. There is an invariant inner circle of practices that constitute community life and a more adaptable outer circle of practices that give witness and service to the world. 72 It may be that the ordinary practices of Christian spirituality provide means of moral formation that will not be found in philosophical virtue ethics. 73 Since philosophers are wary about endorsing any particular way of life, their accounts of virtue and character may inevitably remain somewhat formal. 74 Christian spirituality, by comparison, has developed a whole series of practices that are meant to help individuals and communities develop in a particular way of life. At the same time, looking at the internal standards of excellence embedded in the practice and measuring it against biblical and communal wisdom can keep Christian spirituality from becoming narcissistic pietism.
